One of the major failures of mail ballot elections is that they do not
provide a secret ballot as guaranteed in the Colorado Constitution, and
the constitutions of most other states.
For mail ballots election
officials usually now have voters insert their ballot in secrecy envelope
that is then placed in an outer mailer as a result of previous complaints
that ballot and mailing envelope were opened together. Thus, in the past
election judges and others could readily see the voter's name and how they
had voted on their ballot.
In El Paso County, Colorado, the outer envelope also now comes with a
cover over the signature block as well.
But the underlying problem of a secret ballot still isn't solved.
Ballot inventory and control
The first step toward stuffing the ballot box is obtaining a ballot. Of
course with mail ballot elections there are thousands and thousands of
unclaimed or undeliverable ballots lying around or easily obtained by "dumpster
diving."
Therefore, one of the most fundamental protections against election
fraud is careful control of ballots and an inventory. Thus, each ballot is
numbered with the precinct number and a ballot number, as well as ballot
style and other information, usually on a removable tab at the top of the
ballot.
Step 1 -Record number of ballot sent or given to voter
To ensure integrity any competent election official will record the
ballot number mailed to a voter either in a mail ballot election, or as an
absentee ballot.
For example, voter XXX in precinct YYY is sent ballot number ZZZ and
style A (a precinct can have more than one ballot style), which is
recorded in the poll book.
Step 2 - Check that voter has returned the same ballot they were
sent
In a precinct election the removable tab at the top of the ballot is
torn off before the ballot is put into the ballot box and precautions are
taken that the ballot never leaves the precinct while in the voter's
hands. As a result, in a precinct, the voter's ballot can no longer be
associated with him or her, but ballot inventory and control are
maintained by keeping the detached tabs and checking them against the poll
book.
But with a mail ballot that tab, with the ballot number ZZZ, is still
attached to the ballot that is enclosed in the secrecy envelope. And
before the ballot can be counted, election officials must check that
ballot ZZZ is the same one voter XXX was mailed, during which time it is
usually quite obvious how the voter voted as the ballot, with the tab
attached, is sitting in front of them.
Votes are not secret with mail ballot
Unfortunately, if the tab is removed
from the ballot before it is put in the secrecy envelope there is then no
way to ensure it is the ballot sent to voter XXX and numbered ZZZ. And
with the optical scanners used to count the votes in the backroom at
election central (a notoriously corrupt practice in itself), any valid
ballot taken from the dumpster will be counted as the scanner can "read"
all ballot styles for all precincts in the election.
Conversely, optical scanners used in a
precinct can only read the ballot styles valid for that precinct if
correctly programmed. And hand counting of votes in a precinct is even
more secure, accurate, and reliable than optical scanners or DREs.
Or just ignore the law and
Constitution
An option used by Hart Intercivic is to
encode the ballot number on the ballot rather than just on a detachable
tab. When the ballot is scanned that number is read and checked against
the poll book electronically, which is quite convenient for county clerks,
but a fundamental violation of election law and the constitutional
requirement for a secret ballot.
For more information on why mail ballots
are a bad idea see http://www.ejfi.org/Voting/Voting-77.htm.